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Post-Lecture Discussion
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SPEECH:

ADENO ADDIS
REV. WILLIAM M. LEWERS, C.S.C.
"INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITARIANISM,
AND THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC MINORITIES"

DATE:

MARCH 1, 1991

Rev. Lewer. I am sure that all of you join with me in thanking
Professor Addis for this very stimulating and perceptive conference
on the subject of individualism, communitarianism and ethnic
rights.
Professor Addis and I had been discussing a problem that I
had mentioned before this hour: the problem that arises when
two values, two goods, come into conflict. The case I posed was
the well-known Lovelace case from Canada which went before the
Human Rights Committee. The case involved the interest in selfdetermination, the ability to define the membership of a group,
and the right of a minority group to exclude persons.
The Lovelace case concerned a Canadian Indian tribe and Mrs.
Lovelace, who married outside of the tribe. Under the tribal rule
and the Canadian law, Mrs. Lovelace and her children thereby lost
tribal status. However, if an Indian male married outside the tribe,
he did not lose his status as a member of the tribe, nor did his
children. Mrs. Lovelace married outside the tribe. She later divorced her husband and wished to move back to the reservation
with her children. The question then arose concerning her eligibility to tribal status. The interest in self-determination conflicts
with the interests against gender discrimination. Both" are good.
Both are values. Is there any way in which we can decide for one
value, one interest, over another, or is it simply a conflict that we
can not resolve?
Professor Addis- That is a difficult question, but my view is that the
action of the Canadian government might be defensible. This is
the reason:
Rev. Lewers. I would like to say that the Canadian government
ruled in favor of the tribe and against Mrs. Lovelace.
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Professor Addis- If we are talking about cultural rights, then we
must also entertain the possibility that some people are going to
be excluded. Admission is an important factor. If the group cannot decide who it wants to admit, if a group can function only so
far as it agrees with the majority culture, then there is no minority
culture. On the other hand, I think we must be sure that exit is
available. Exit is very important. If one wants to get out, I think
one should be able to do so.
I also think that some aspects of a culture might not be central to the culture. That is, the culture could survive without them.
Now, it is difficult to decide what is peripheral and what is central,
if the decision is made from the outside. And it seems to me that
without having made that decision, we can not say that they do
not have the right to refuse readmission.
Participant I think a part of the problem was that the Canadian
court, which was deciding the matter, was an interested party. So
the consideration of and solution to the issue may not only involve resolving two conflicting values, but also may include determining which institution will make the decision. Could you contemplate an Indian court that would review these decisions?
Professor Addis. Yes, and that actually has been the suggestion made
by some writers. That is probably the way to go, and that is what I
mean by people within the culture determining what is and what
is not central to their cultural practice.
What I am reluctant to accept is the idea that the majority
could somehow define what is and what is not acceptable within a
particular minority culture without that totally destroying that
specific culture.
Participant:The basic problem with the Lovelace case is, of course,
the discrimination, and that is a crucial point here. Either neither
the man nor the woman could reenter, or both of them could
reenter; that is the basic principle of equality in the Human
Rights system. Generally speaking, that principle applies not only
to the cultural minority, but also to all societies based on the
principle that the international human rights system may require
all of us to make certain changes. For example, Norway had to
change its constitution in order to become a member of the European Convention. If you accept this national human rights requirement, then you have to change important aspects of your culture.
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Otherwise you cannot be party to the Convention. The principle
of equality between the sexes, in terms of members or nonmembers, was at stake in the Lovelace case. The question is not whether
the Indian community could have lost on this issue, but rather, if
they had lost, would they have to apply their rules equally for men
and women?
Professor Addis. I am not quite sure what procedures Canada uses
when it ratifies treaties. Treaties are executed with reservations all
the time. You don't have to agree to the whole thing. Many countries do that, as I understand it.
Participant You cannot have reservations which defeat the purpose
of the provision.
Participant:But, we have many communities that violate fundamental notions of norms, like gender norms. For instance, religious
communities and churches. The Judeo-Christian community contains great differences among Protestant churches and within Judaism. Your point may focus on who decides upon the change,
someone within the church or some external body. For instance,
the Mormon church had a serious problem with racism. Consider
the rules as to who can become a Mormon. Now, we may differentiate that from the Indian tribal situation by saying that the Mormon racism is not a state action. Maybe that is how the Human
Rights Committee viewed it, I am not sure. But, in fact, in terms
of the affect and importance to people's lives, these other communities may de facto have as much power or more power than
states do.
Participant Regarding the question of the rehabilitation of culture,
it seems like one of the things that we get into when we bring up
the example of Indian culture being discriminatory against women
(and that is always the kind of objection that is made) is a bias
against tradition per se-enlightenment v. tradition-and we ne-gate the possibility that other traditions have the internal critical
resources to develop those concepts themselves. It seems like we
are digging into another part of a rehabilitation of culture which
entails a different understanding of what it is to be traditional,
which is not a static, oppressive, unenlightened position. The resources for a critical encounter within the tradition might be different from the western tradition or the enlightenment tradition.
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But those resources do exist, and at various times they will diminish, and when a culture is under siege those resources may be less
visible than when it is prospering.
Participant: I think we have come to an extremely difficult and
important question: What do we do in a situation in which basic
values, which you call rights, conflict between the majority group
and the minority group? Obviously, I don't have a solution either.
I want to make one point: Those values which we consider to be
basic values now change fast. The prohibition of gender-based
discrimination didn't exist thirty years ago, but started maybe
twenty years ago. One thing that we should always keep in mind is
that absolutely granted and absolutely essential values might
change.
Furthermore, I can't imagine that the cultural majority could
allow a minority to have, for example, courts which would inflict
cruel penalties, such as mutilation; that would be unacceptable to
the U.S., Germany, or any other western country. It is a very complex situation, and we must limit tolerance toward minority cultures while keeping in mind that it is a floating and continuous
process.
Participant: I would like to return to the question of the trade-off
between respect for international, individual needs and rights and
the preservation of the culture. First, I think it is important not to
completely link that issue with the question of minorities because
exactly the same problem appears for states. Small states also have
cultures, and the international community may affect those cultures. It is not only an issue for minorities. It is not a problem
related to minorities; it is another small state syndrome. It is an
old issue regarding the universal recognition of individual rights.
Regarding the trade-off, you have to weigh the importance of
that particular aspect of the culture which is underfed against the
importance of that particular avenue in that particular provisional,
international human rights requirement. If it is a marginal aspect
of the culture, then you can let it go in order to accommodate.
And, as I mentioned with the case of Norway, in the 15th or 16th
century their feelings about Jesuits were pretty strong. But by 1956
the Jesuits were a nonproblem, yet we had simply kept the constitution as it had always been. So letting that part of the constitution go was not a problem. But in other situations the questioned
element is crucial to maintaining the culture, and without it, the
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culture will break down. In that situation, of course, the trade-off
is different. If the conflicting principle is a minor aspect of the
international human rights system, then the minority's cultural
norm would survive against the international principle.
Professor Addis: I agree. I said earlier that some values might be
peripheral and some central. The question is: Who decides how to
characterize the value? Who decides what is peripheral and what is
central? I prefer that groups have internal mechanisms by which
they decide themselves what is peripheral and what is central. I
know there is conflict, but I also know that the voices of "enlightenment" and "rationality" have inflicted a great deal of damage
on those they regard as not enlightened enough, all in the name
of higher principles. It seems to me rather odd to say that the
very groups (majorities) who have traditionally viewed minorities
and their cultures to be on the whole peripheral be invested with
the authority to decide what" is central and what is peripheral in
these cultures.
Rev. Lewer. I am going to exercise my prerogative as the chair,
since it is now 5:00, and ask you to join me in thanking Professor
Addis for a very provocative and stimulating presentation and for
his insights and perceptions.

